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Summary. These are the written discussions of the paper “Bayesian measures of model complexity and fit" by D.
Spiegelhalter et al. (2002), following the discussions given at the Annual Meeting of the Royal Statistical Society in
Newcastle-upon-Tyne on September 3rd, 2013.
1. Discussion by E. Moreno and F.-J. Vázquez–Polo
This is an interesting paper, in which a new dimension correction to penalise over-fit models is presented. It
has given rise to considerable discussion; here, we focus on the DIC model selection procedure defined in the
paper.
Eleven years later, model selection for complex models remains an open problem. The weak link of the
Bayesian model selection approach is the elicitation of the prior over models and over the model parameters to
be used in the procedure. Several priors have been proposed for interesting model selection problems, such as
variable selection in high dimensional regression, clustering, change points and classification, but none of them
satisfy all reasonable requirements. Thus, we fully agree with the authors’ claim in justifying DIC that “full
elicitation of informative priors and utilities is simply not feasible in most situations”. However, this does not
imply that in model selection we can avoid the use of priors in a coherent way (Berger and Pericchi, 2001).
1.1. Does the DIC have a justification from a decision theory viewpoint?
In model selection we have a sample yn of size n, a discrete class of k competing sampling modelsM, the sampling
density of model Mi is f(yn|θi,Mi), and a prior for models and model parameters pi(θi,Mi) = pi(θi|Mi) pi(Mi),
where θi ∈ Θi . The parameter spaces are typically continuous.
In model selection the quantity of interest is the model, and therefore the decision space is D =
{
dj ,
j = 1, ..., k
}
, where dj is the decision to choose model Mj, and the states of nature is the class of models M.
Given a loss function L(di,Mj), L : D×M −→ R
+, the optimal Bayesian decision is to choose the model Mpi
such that
Mpi = arg min
i=1,...,k
k∑
j=1
L(di,Mj)pi(Mj |yn),
where
pi(Mj |yn) =
mj(yn)pi(Mj)∑k
j=1mj(yn)pi(Mj)
,
and the marginal mi(yn) =
∫
Θi
f(yn|θi,Mi)pi(θi|Mi)dθi, is the likelihood of model Mi, i = 1, ..., k. This means
that whatever loss function L(di,Mj) we use, the optimal decision depends on the posterior model probabilities;
that is, the decision formulation takes into account the uncertainty of the model. However, the DIC does not
depend on pi(Mj |yn), j = 1, ..., k.
1.2. Does the DIC correspond to a Bayesian procedure?
The Bayesian procedures automatically penalise model complexity without any adjustment (Dawid, 2002),
and this is a good reason to require a model selection procedure to be Bayesian. Another reason is that the
competing models can be averaged, with the weights being the model posterior probabilities. On the other
hand, for Schwarz’s Bayesian information criterion (BIC), to compare model Mi with Mj,
−2 logBICij(yn) = −2 log
f(yn|θˆi(yn),Mi)
f(yn|θˆj(yn),Mj)
+ (di − dj) log n,
where di, dj are the dimensions of Θi and Θj, there is a Bayes factor Bij such that |−2 log Bij−2 logBICij | =
OP (n
−1/2) (Kass and Wasserman, 1995), and thus the BIC asymptotically corresponds to a Bayes factor, we
do not see that a similar correspondence can be established with the
DICij(yn) = −2 log
f(yn|θ¯i(yn),Mi)
f(yn|θ¯j(yn),Mj)
+ Correctionij
where θ¯i(yn) = Eθi|ynθi, and
Correctionij = 4
{
Eθi|yn log f(yn|θi,Mi)− Eθj |yn log f(yn|θj ,Mi)
}
+ 4 log
f(yn|θ˜i(yn),Mi)
f(yn|θ˜j(yn),Mj)
.
We note that under mild conditions |θˆ(yn)− θ¯(yn)| = OP (n
−1), and hence the main difference between BIC
and DIC comes from the correction term. As a result of this term, the DIC does not correspond to a Bayesian
procedure.
1.3. Asymptotic.
The DIC is not a consistent model selection procedure and although it is a negative property of the procedure,
this does not seem to worry the authors, who argue that “we neither believe in a true model nor would expect
the list of models being considered ”. This implies that the probability of a model has no meaning, as no model
space is considered. However, the point is that if we applied the DIC to a case in which the class of models
were known, we would have consistency.
On the other hand, some statisticians, for instance Fraser (2011), have suggested that the sampling properties
of the Bayesian methods should be studied. In this respect, Wasserman (2011) asserts that “we must be vigilant
and pay careful attention to the sampling properties of procedures". We agree with both these views. Moreover,
consistency is a very useful sampling property that allows us to compare the behaviour of alternative Bayesian
model selection procedures for complex models.
Consistency in a model selection procedure for a given class of models M means that when sampling from a
model in M, the posterior probability of this model tends to one as the sample size tends to infinity. Bayesian
procedures for model selection are typically consistent when the dimension of the models is small compared with
the sample size (David, 1992; Casella et al., 2009). Furthermore, when the model from which we are sampling
is not in the class M, the Bayesian procedure asymptotically chooses a model in M that is as close as possible
to the true one, in the Kullback–Leibler distance.
On the other hand, consistent Bayesian procedures for low dimensional models are not necessarily consis-
tent for high dimensional models. For example: (a) Schwarz’s approximation to the Bayes factor BIC is not
necessarily consistent in high dimensional settings (Berger, 2003; Moreno et al., 2010). (b) When the num-
ber of models increases with the sample size, as occurs in clustering, change point or classification problems,
consistency of the Bayesian model selection procedure depends not only on the prior over the model param-
eters but also on the prior over the models. In fact, default priors commonly used for discrete spaces may
give an inconsistent Bayesian model selection procedure, as occurs in clustering when using the uniform prior
over the models (Casella et al., 2012). (c) In variable selection in regression when the number of regressors p
increases with the sample size, i.e., p = O(nb), 0 ≤ b ≤ 1, some priors that are commonly used over the model
parameters and over the model space make the Bayesian procedures inconsistent. For instance, the g−priors
(Zellner, 1986) with g = n produce an inconsistent Bayesian procedure. The mixture of g−priors with respect
to the InverseGamma(g|1/2, n/2), or the intrinsic priors (Moreno et al., 1998) over the model parameters when
combined with the independent Bernoulli prior on the model space (George and McCulloch, 1997; Raftery et
al., 1997) may also provide an inconsistent Bayesian procedure.
These results show that consistency can be a very useful property for the difficult task of selecting priors for
model selection in complex models.
2. Discussion by C.P. Robert
The main issue with DIC undoubtedly is the question of its worth for (or within) Bayesian decision analysis
(since I doubt there exist many proponents of DIC outside the Bayesian community). The appeal of DIC is,
I presume, to deliver a single summary per model for all models under comparison and to allow therefore for
a complete ranking of those models. I however object at the worth of simplicity for simplicity’s sake: models
are complex (albeit less than reality) and their usages are complex as well. To consider that model A is to
be preferred upon model B just because DIC(A) = 1228 < DIC(B) = 1237 is a mimicry of the complex
mechanisms at play behind model choice, especially given the wealth of information provided by a Bayesian
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framework. (Non-Bayesian paradigms may be more familiar with procedures based on a single estimator value.)
And to abstain from accounting for the significance of the difference between DIC(A) and DIC(B) clearly
makes matters worse.
This is not even discussing the stylised setting where one model is considered as “true" and where procedures
are compared by their ability to recover the “truth". David Spiegelhalter repeatedly mentioned during his talk
that he was not interested in this. This stance inevitably brings another objection, though, namely that models–
as tools instead of approximations to reality–can only be compared against their predictive abilities, which DIC
seems unable to capture. Once again, what is needed in this approach to model comparison is a multi-factor
and all-encompassing criterion that evaluates the predictive models in terms of their recovery of some features
of the phenomenon under study. Or of the process being conducted. (Even stooping down to a one-dimensional
loss function that is supposed to summarise the purpose of the model comparison does not produce anything
close to the DIC function, unless one agrees to massive approximations.)
Obviously, considering that asymptotic consistency is of no importance whatsoever (as repeated by David
Spiegelhalter in his presentation) easily avoids some embarrassing questions, except the (still embarrassing) one
about the true purpose of statistical models and procedures. How can those be compared if no model is true
and if accumulating data from a given model is not meaningful? How can simulation be conducted in such a
barren landscape? I find this minimalist attitude the more difficult to accept that models are truly used as if
they were or could be true, at several stages in the process. It also prevents the study of the criterion under
model misspecification, which would clearly be of interest.
Another point worth discussing, already exposed in Celeux et al. (2006)), is that there is no unique driving
principle for constructing DICs. In that paper inspired from the discussion by De Iorio and Robert (2002), we
examined eight different and natural versions of DIC for mixture models, resulting in highly diverging values
for DIC and the effective dimension of the parameter, I believe that such a lack of focus is bound to reappear
in any multi-modal setting and fear that the answer about (eight) different focus on what matters in the model
is too cursory and lacks direction for the hapless practitioner.
My final and critical remark about DIC is that the criterion shares very much the same perspective as Murray
Aitkin’s integrated likelihood, as already stressed in Robert and Titterington (2002). Both Aitkin (1991, 2010)
and Spiegelhalter et al. (2002) consider a posterior distribution on the likelihood function, taken as a function
of the parameter but omitting the delicate fact that it also depends on the observable and hence does not exist
a priori. See Gelman et al. (2013)) for a detailed review of Aitkin’s (2010) book, since most of the criticisms
therein equally apply to DIC, and I will not reproduce them here, except for pointing out that DIC escapes the
Bayesian framework (and thus requires even more its own justifications).
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